

in more in-depth examination have an excellent starting point for doing so, both because of the empirical foundation the book provides and the questions it leaves unanswered. In focusing on enduring party movements, many of which live on today as either formal organizations or resonant ideas, readers may be left wondering why those that ultimately failed did so—or how long they can keep it up, if they are still active. Alternatively, what organizational characteristics better enabled party movements to take the steps that they did and overcome the disruptions caused by what seem to be fairly dramatic choices? Although I agree with the author that these new directions are not necessarily responses to dramatic events, phenomena such as purges, mergers, and takeovers represent more than marginal adjustments to organizational mission, and their consequences are potentially dramatic (even if they do not seem that way from the perspective of organizational actors at the time). So, although we learn a great deal about how strategies of endurance are linked to efforts at organizational problem solving, the question of how social movements can secure the skill set, knowledge, and organizational structures necessary to undertake them and survive remains a pressing subject for future research.

A major contribution of this book is that it establishes an ambitious agenda for taking social movements that are directly engaged in electoral politics much more seriously as an object of inquiry. This is as relevant for social movement scholars as it is for social scientists interested in electoral politics and political development. Schwartz's analysis is also a timely reminder of the continuing relevance of organizational theories for understanding political action, broadly defined, and as such it should be of interest to those scholars who care about the potential for cross-fertilization between social movement and organizational theories. A more implicit, but no less significant, contribution of *Party Movements in the United States and Canada* is that it brings into focus an available vehicle for political influence that builds on a longer tradition of persistent activism, a persistence that we can be well served by understanding both as scholars and as citizens.

Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? By Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2006. Pp. xiii+268. \$49.95.

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Marxism has been an ideological force in Iran's politics for over a century; it shaped the emotional energy of the faithful who made the ultimate sacrifice to realize the Marxist prophecy that the course of history will end all forms of exploitation. The political outcomes that Iranian Marxists

contributed to their creation were far removed from their lofty humanistic objective, however. Marxists assassinated a key leader of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–7, were accused of callousness toward Iran's national interests in the oil nationalization movement of the early 1950s, and committed the heinous act of political opportunism in allying with the religious fanatics against a modernizing monarch in the revolution of 1979.

The Pahlavis failed to eliminate the Left, but Ayatollah Khomeini masterfully sealed the fate of ideological Marxism in slaughtering several thousand Marxist and non-Marxist political prisoners in 1987. Although the Left played a significant role in radicalizing opposition to the monarch and shaping the political attitudes of Muslim fundamentalists, its intellectual legacy for understanding the nature of power relations and class inequality in Iran has been disturbingly limited and unreflective. In fact, when the Ayatollah's killing machine finished its job in "purifying" the *umma* of non-Islamic currents, it was as if the Left had never existed.

Against this background, it is refreshing to read Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad's *Class and Labor in Iran*, an impressive monograph that may shape scholarly debates on class inequality in Iran and the revolution that ostensibly intended to transcend it, bringing into relief a new Marxist hypothetico-deductive tradition in the study of Iranian society. In this book, Nomani and Behdad offer a scientific model in order to account for the process of economic change and the ensuing class inequality in postrevolutionary Iran. Drawing from the Wisconsin model of structuralist Marxism, Nomani and Behdad specify six class positions: capitalists, middle class, petty bourgeois, unpaid family workers, working class, and political functionaries. They then use primarily 1976, 1986, and 1996 census data to construct the distribution of occupational positions into these six categories and explain the process of change in this distribution from what it was in 1976, three years before the revolution, to what it became in 1986, a couple of years before the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, and finally to a class structure in 1996 that resembled the prerevolutionary structure of class relations.

To conceptualize the economic processes underpinning the changes in class structure, Nomani and Behdad argue that Iran's postrevolutionary economic crisis signified a serious erosion of capitalist relations of production and the rise of petty-commodity production. The authors call this degenerative process "structural involution," which created tangles within the existing economic structure, impeded the accumulation process, and intensified the economic crisis. This process was manifested in sectoral shifts in production and employment, increased peasantization of agriculture, deproletarianization of the workforce, and an expansion of service activities. Following the establishment of the Islamic regime, a new "deinvolution" process set in around 1988. It was the reversal of previous development toward reconstruction of the capitalist relations of produc-

tion, restoration of the accumulation process, proletarianization of the workforce, and depeasantization of agriculture.

Iran's class profile reflects these changes. The capitalist class and the middle class are the only two classes whose size had increased between 1976, 1986, and 1996. The size of the capitalist class increased from 2.1% of the workforce in 1976 to 3.1% in 1986 and to 3.6% in 1996. These figures for the middle class size were 5.4%, 7.0%, and 10.2%, respectively. The size of the other four classes fluctuates between 31.9%, 39.9%, and 35.7% for the petty bourgeoisie; 11.6%, 4.4%, and 5.5% for unpaid family workers; 40.2%, 24.6%, and 31.1% for the working class; and 8.3%, 16.8%, and 10.7% for political functionaries across the three periods (p. 89). The expansion of the size of the petty bourgeoisie and political functionaries and the contraction of the size of the working class in the first period of postrevolutionary years reflect the involutory process, while the decrease in the size of the petty bourgeoisie and political functionaries and the increase in the size of the working class in the second period indicate the effects of the deinvolutionary process. Although the latter process is not yet completed, there are striking similarities between the class nature of the employed workforce in 1996 and 1976 (p. 118).

The authors also show that postrevolutionary economic change was not particularly friendly to women, as their relative share of employment declined from 13.8% in 1976 to 8.9% in 1986 and to 12.1% in 1996. Although the downward trend in women's employment was reversed in the second period, their share in 1996 did not reach the prerevolutionary level. For women working at lower-level working groups, this decline has been much more dramatic, however. The book also offers an interesting analysis of urban-rural differences in employment and is sprinkled with useful information about literacy rates and the understanding of the Persian language in different provinces and among various ethnic minorities.

Class and Labor in Iran may be criticized for failing to consider social classes in specific historical contexts, assess the effects of the clergy's status interests in shaping class structure/politics, evaluate the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on female employment, and appraise the impact of the rentier economy on class relations. Since the revolution has failed, and in many crucial respects Iranians were better off in 1976 than they were in any period after the revolution, addressing these issues is important in order to explain the factors that really mattered in postrevolutionary development.

Nonetheless, Nomani and Behdad have produced an empirically based, theoretically sophisticated, and clearly written work. Therefore, it has my most enthusiastic endorsement.